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fectiveness of international law and organization
is concerned with international environmental
law. Such literature (Jacobson, Harold K. &
Weiss, "Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords: Preliminary Observations from a Collaborative Project", Global
Governmance 1 (1995), 119-148) now distinguishes between compliance with international
law and effectiveness. For, even if all states were
to comply with provisions for protection of the
environment the law might not be effective in
preventing further degradation. While I recognize that Tacsan wishes to move away from a
simple compliance/non-compliance as opposed
to effectiveness. I think that the paper would be
strengthened through distinguishing between
compliance and effectiveness.
To conclude, I agree with Tacsan that the "concept" of normative knowledge, as developed by
Peter Haas, is a useful one but believe that it does
not in itself have great explanatory potential
unless situated within a broader framework of
the relationship between international law and
politics. While I do not think this is a suitable
occasion on which to discuss at length my own
theorization of this relationship I do believe that
a theorization of international law as neutral ideology provides such a framework. I would welcome further discussion along these lines.
Shirley Scott
University of New South Wales

The Effectiveness of
International Law
To be "effective" international law must be
obeyed. Often it is, even by unopposably powerful nations such as the United States of
America. Why? Force and coercion cannot be
the reason, but fear plays a role-the fear of appearing unjust in one's own eyes, or the eyes of
one's friends.
I. Blame
Greek kings in the Homeric age employed
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poets to praise themselves and to blame their
enemies. Praise and blame set the parameters of
acceptable behavior, which could be moved in
one direction or another by clever verses and a
loud voice, within certain external canons of
plausibility. Some behavior simply is not praiseworthy. Some sovereigns deserve to be blamed.
These human universals made international
law possible, when scholars such as Grotius,
Pufendorf and Vattel first expressed their perceptions of the universal jus gentium-perceptions whose influence depended entirely upon
the author's ability to convince readers of the
justice and utility of proposed precepts of behavior. Some scholars had more authority than others, and could move law in one direction or another at the behest of their royal employers, just
as a good poet could manipulate Hellenic public
opinion with elegant verses or a memorable line
of invective.
Human nature relies on the concepts of
"right" and "wrong". As social animals we have
a natural tendency to think in moral terms, to
turn fiercely on others who violate our sense of
propriety, and to feel shame when we ourselves
transgress, or others perceive us to have done
so. As rational animals, humans naturally seek
to turn these moral emotions to their private advantage, manipulating human feelings of indignation and shame to serve selfish ends, constructing conceptions of justice that harness public
opinion to private interests, and cultivating selfrighteousness in pursuit of personal appetites
and desires.
II. Normative Knowledge
Speaking in terms of "right" and "wrong"
implies that there are "right" and "wrong" answers to moral questions. Praise and blame depend on claims of "normative knowledge" - the
knowledge that one activity or attitude is "right"
and praiseworthy and another is "wrong" or
shameful.
Some types of normative knowledge are
widely shared. The "golden rule," for example,
has overwhelming resonance, as do its concomitant hesitations about homophagy, or the recreational deprivation of human life. But even these
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prohibitions are violated, with confidence, in
societies that have constructed social realities to
support their moral eccentricity. People care a
great deal about the views of others, and can be
moved quite far even from quasi-instinctual
moral knowledge by the pressure of social constructs, like religion.
Nevertheless, the presumption of normative
knowledge invites discussion of its content, and
implies that grounds must be offered for any
views advanced. Like other knowledge, normative knowledge rests on arguments about human
perceptions, and is subject to change. Communities of discourse will tend to converge on certain answers to contested moral questions. Discussion and reflection lead to deeper and more
accurate knowledge about norms. People find
it very hard to maintain idiosyncratic personal
"truths" in the face of steady interaction with
others.
III. Epistemic Communities
Human communities tend to converge on
shared conceptions of moral and scientific
"truth." But this fact of human nature need not
always mean that social "truth" and reality coincide. Societies often construct moral conceptions to serve their interests, or the interests of
those who dominate the social discourse. Powers that control the television and radio transmissions in a given territory, for example, will
have a disproportionate impact on that specific
society's outlook, and conceptions of moral
knowledge.
Those interested in justice, by which I mean
real moral knowledge about the structure of political societies, will need a theory of valid
epistemic community. For although it is natural
that epistemic communities should converge on
shared conceptions of "moral knowledge," these
conceptions may be false or unjust. One advantage of international law in pursuit of justice lies
in its transcendence of numerous otherwise discrete epistemic communities, since it must apply to governments throughout the world, and
gain their acceptance.
But this is a disadvantage also, because so
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many governments serve the unjust and improper interests of their rulers, often violent and
self-interested local elites or individuals. Giving such figures a voice in international moral
discourse corrupts the creation of moral knowledge about international law. When unjust regimes predominate, international legal discourse
may even serve to encourage and validate injustice, while putting democracies and liberal republics on the defensive, by allowing despots to reinforce and justify each other's bad behavior.
IV. Consensus
Consensus creates the international legal regime, consensus first about the principles of international law, and then about the details of their
application. Widespread consensus creates compliance, even among regimes that may not fully
share the consensus thus created. Human actors tend to internalize widely-shared moral standards. Individuals find it personally difficult to
maintain a separate viewpoint in the face of overwhelming agreement. Diplomats and politicians
suffer shame at cocktail parties. Their children
criticize them. They doubt their own convictions.
Who will have a voice in the international forum becomes immensely important, and one
major task of detached or supposedly dispassionate analysis of international law in universities
and elsewhere, should be to determine which
voices deserve to be heard. If participants in
moral discussions tend to converge on consensus, who should these participants be to create
the most just or accurate conception of moral
knowledge? Democratic republics rest on the
principle that all voices should be heard that are
willing to debate the creation of a shared or
"common" good. According to this theory, justice best emerges from the widest possible discussion with the greatest number of sincere participants.
Looking primarily to sovereign governments
to represent the voices of their populations presents an obvious problem when most governments serve the narrow interests of a ruling
clique. Non-governmental organizations, the
media and other self-appointed and self-regulated groups also suffer from a lack of democratic
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accountability. Their motives may be purer than
those of most governments, but their value lies
more in the information they bring to the discussion, such as satellite data, or scientific studies, than it does in any legitimate claim to be
heard or respected about the emerging content
of moral knowledge about international law.
V. Operational Systems
Joaquin Tacsan has distinguished "myth systems" of normative knowledge from the "operational systems" that apply then. "Myth systems"
will be more or less appealing depending on the
quality of the norms they embody. Operational
systems develop the consensus that make these
norms effective.
Operational systems may be more or less successful (1)in achieving consensus and (2) in finding justice. Both attributes are important. The
ideal operational system will create consensus
about real normative knowledge-will help
people and nations to find and agree upon normative truth.
I would like to suggest that democratic republics make the best operational systems for discovering legal norms, and that a republican federation of democratic republics will be the best
operating system for authorizing or legitimating
moral knowledge about international law.
VI. Democratic Republics
By "democratic republics" I mean states committed to finding the common good (res publica)
for their inhabitants through public deliberation
(democracy) in which all citizens have a voice.
A republican federation of democratic republics
is a federation of states that observes the same
rules of participation and deliberation among the
representatives of its component peoples that
they observe internally among their own citizens.
Such states and federations will more likely discover valid normative truths than other epistemic
communities, because they involve the moral
perceptions of wider groups of people, under
conditions of mutual cooperation.
The best epistemic community for discovering international law will include only those
ASIL e

voices that seek the common good, and respect
the democratic process. Other voices, be they
governments, publicists, non-governmental organizations or the media should carry weight
only to the extent that they convey useful information to democratically validated participants
in the international normative discourse.
The substance of international law depends
on consensus, and consensus depends in turn
on the identity of those that forge it. Democratic
republics deserve deference in this process, and
should not themselves be swayed by the views
of non-democratic or non-republican voices. International law should not be effective unless it
is just, and it will not be just if its epistemic community embraces too many corrupted or usurping speakers.
VII. The Rule of Law
The rule of law ideal constrains decisions
made in democratic republics more than in other
states, because only through the rule of law can
democratic decisions ever successfully guide
government officials in service of the common
good. This makes the concept of "law" a powerful tool in international relations for moving
democratic republics towards conformity. They
blame themselves for legal transgressions. Successfully label something a "law" and the battle
for effectiveness will soon be won, at least among
the democratic republics.
Tribunals such as the International Court of
Justice derive improper influence from this analogy with domestic legal institutions. One must
examine the provenance of would-be lawgivers
before deferring to their rulings. Did they arise
from a democratic process? Who had a voice in
the decision? The authority of the International
Court of Justice is diminished by its derivation
from the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations, which contain many
corrupt and despotic governments, and by the
limited terms in office of the judges themselves,
which leaves them subject to outside influences.
International law derives in part from universal perceptions of normative reality and in part
from the expression of that reality by authorized
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speakers. This latter process posits specific rules
of law, and the claim that states should respect
them. "Extrinsic" factors about the structure of
international discourse may have as much influence on state behavior as the "intrinsic" validity
of the norms proposed. The more the standards
advanced can be made to look like law, the more
likely they will be obeyed.
Conclusion
The effectiveness of international law rests on
two pillars: the desire to respect its norms and
the ability to do so. Ability depends primarily
on the existence of a functioning bureaucracy,
fostered through education and the rule of law
to create the discipline and intelligence without
which obedience cannot occur. Desire is more
complicated, and grows out of either "normative knowledge" or the threat of violence. The
first has been my main concern here, since powerful states safely disregard most external sanctions.
"Normative knowledge" may be manipulated
by eloquent argument and the structure of the
relevant epistemic community. Consensus creates international law, but consensus will be mistaken when the wrong actors play too large a role
inits elaboration. Yet truth has special resonance.
Those who would subvert normative reality find
their task more difficult once morally significant
truths ever enter the conversation.
Scholars should see to it that this happens, and
strive to bring international institutions into line
with democratic and republican imperatives.
International lawyers Who wish to measure,
monitor, or even to predict the effectiveness of
international norms should look first to the
norm's validity and then to its foundations in
democratic discourse. The sounder this basis the
longer the law will survive to influence the actions of the international community.
Mortimer Sellers
University of Baltimore
School of Law
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From Politics to Consensus?:
A Comment on Tacsan
Dr. Joacquin Tacsan's article The Effectiveness
of InternationalLaw: An Alternative Approach
moves the discussion about the efficacy of international law from the topic of enforcement, or
lack thereof, to his theory of compliance due to
consensual normative knowledge. Dr. Tacsan
defines knowledge as "the information contained in the principles, norms, rules and other
criteria about proper behavior, as well as in theories about that information." Legal normative
knowledge includes not only treaties, conventions, customary international law, case law and
doctrine, but also "the expectations that actors
derive from their moral and scientific imperatives and perceptions of proper conduct." Consensual normative knowledge is reached when
it dominates the policy-making process and implies acceptance by all major actors.
Working from these definitions, Dr. Tacsan
compares the effectiveness of consensual normative knowledge with coercive enforcement of in
ternational law. He argues that this knowledge
does not have the inherent drawbacks that coercion does in running into sovereignty principles;
logistical, financial and technological limitations;
lack of absolute terms to enforce; and lack of
determinacy. Dr. Tacsan seems to argue that
when consensual normative knowledge exists,
coercion is no longer necessary because all major actors are operating from a common basis of
knowledge and sense of obligation and expectations. The next step from consensual normative knowledge is authorized legal knowledge.
Dr. Tacsan argues that the consensual basis of
normative knowledge also offers legitimacy and
authority in the international legal system and
that it is this level of shared knowledge which is
effective without the need for coercion.
Dr. Tacsan then goes on to discuss the effects
of this approach on international actors and their
decision making. He looks at two normative
systems, myth and operational, defining the
myth system as one that is supposed to be applied but is not and the operational system as
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